CRISIS in HONDURAS

The Recent Crisis in Honduras

On Sunday morning of 28 June2009, Latin America and the world woke up with the news of coup d’état in Honduras. The Central and South American nightmare of military regime replacing the elected democracy has come back to haunt the people. Elected President of Honduras, Jose Manuel Zeyala Rosales, was detained by the military and kept him in an Air Force base and later deported to Costa Rica. Zeyala was replaced by an interim government headed by Roberto Micheletti, the Speaker of Congress. While the international community stood behind the President Zelaya demanding his reinstatement, the three key constitutional institutions in Honduras; the Congress, the Judiciary and the military stood behind the interim government. They later argued that if Zelaya returns to the country, the government has the right to prosecute him for violating the constitution.

Protest by people of Honduras, both pro and anti Zelaya, become regular in the capital city, Tegucigalpa. Zelaya’s attempt to return to Honduras faced an abrupt end with the interim government scrapping Zelaya’s bid to land in Tegucigalpa airport. The stalemate is continuing for a month now with the efforts of the international community has not succeeded in the face of an adamant Honduran government.

Why was there a coup d’état?

Manuel Zelaya won the presidential election of 2005 November from Liberal Party of Honduras (Patrido Liberal de Honduras –PLH) by defeating Profirio Lobo of Nationalist Party (Partido Nacional de Honduras -PNH) and began his four year term in January 2006. By supporting the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States (US), he continued the cordial relationship with their traditional ally.

Half way through his tenure, his political perspective has witnessed a shift. He moved more close to the left leadership in Latin America, i.e., Hugo Chavez, Daniel Ortega, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales. It was begun with the membership of Petrocaribe, an oil subsidy initiative of Venezuela that was ratified by the Honduran Congress on 13 March 2008. His left turn was reiterated when he took Honduras to the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) –an organisation formed by Hugo Chavez as an alternative to counter the US plan for the Free Trade Area of the Americas –on August 2008. Zelaya’s political turn sent mixed signals to the ruling political party as well as to the constitutional institutions which always preferred to be with the US.

Immediate reason for the coup d’état is closely associated with two incidents. President Zelaya proposed a non-binding referendum which was intended to convene a Constitutional Assembly to rewrite the present constitution. This proposal was not welcome by his own party and also by the key constitutional institutions. Based on the request of the Congress, the Honduras’ Supreme Court intervened in the issue and ruled it illegal. President Zelaya persuaded the cause of referendum hoping that the people will take his attempt seriously and support him.

Trigger for the coup was the dismissal of the highest military command, General Romeo Vasquez, from the position on 24 June. General Vazquez kept the material for the referendum under tight military control. He refused to cooperate with the plans of the President of the country, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the army, by arguing that the scheduled referendum was declared illegal by the Supreme Court. Next day, 25 June, the Supreme Court of Honduras intervened in the issue, supporting General Vazquez’s position and ruled out his firing as ‘unconstitutional’. Court’s verdict created divided responses. The supporters of Zelaya moved into the streets expressing their support for the President. Next two days were calm and it seems now that it was a lull before the storm. On the early hours of 28 June (Sunday) morning, armed soldiers appeared in the President’s bedroom and captured him. They took him to a nearby air force base and flown to the neighbouring Costa Rica.

Thereafter, the military took positions in the strategic locations in Tegucigalpa. The military planes and helicopters encircle the city. They arrested the ambassadors from Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua along with Honduran Foreign Minister, Patricia Rodas. They issued arrest warrants for the leaders of Honduran social organisations as well and took control of the communication channels; Canal 8 – the public television channel, terminated services of telephones, internet and electricity after the coup. Honduran Congress immediately formed an interim government under the leadership of Roberto Micheletti. He declared curfew in the country to curtail the protests and mobilisations.

Responses on the coup d’état

International community immediately responded to the coup d’état in the Honduras. United Nation passed a resolution on 30th June calling “firmly and categorically on all states to recognize no government other than that” of Zelaya. The urgent meeting convened to discuss the crisis in Honduras by the Organisation of American States (OAS) imposed a 72 hours deadline to reinstate President Zelaya in power. OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza described the situation as “an old fashioned coup[i]”. On the completion of 72 hours deadline, the OAS decided to drop Honduras from its basic membership[ii]. The most embarrassing for the supporters of the coup, was the response from teh US government. On 28 June, Barack Obama, the US President stated that he believed “that the coup was not legal and the President Zelaya remains the democratically elected President there”[iii], and stressed that it “would be a terrible precedent if we start moving backwards into the era in which we are seeing military coups as a means of political transition rather than democratic elections”[iv]. The ALBA group; the Rio Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries stood behind Zelaya, pressurising the interim government to complete his tenure. Though, almost all Latin American countries and regional organisations turned against the military takeover, the interim government of Honduras refused to succumb to the international pressure. After dropping Honduras from the member status of OAS, Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza requested the Nobel Laureate Oscar Arias, the President of Costa Rica, to mediate the talks between the interim government and President Zelaya to resolve the crisis.

The actions of the Honduran Constitutional Institutions and the interim government, however, were justified by some sections. Some US based think-tank organisations openly defended it, stating that, “this was not a military coup. The military blocked an attempted civilian coup by Manuel Zelaya”[v]. They argued that through the non-binding referendum, Zelaya was ultimately aiming to amend the existing constitution allow him to contest again in the Presidential election, which was strictly prohibited by the existing constitution. In this regard Zelaya is following the footsteps of Chavez. The proposed referendum was an effort directed by the Venezuelan leader to expand his leftist ideology into Central America, critics stated. Some of the political decisions of Zelaya, such as signing with Petrocarib, joining ALBA, increasing minimum wage by 60 per cent and new approach to control drug trafficking, were placed as evidence taking away Honduras from the traditional ally (US) to the leftist camp.

The media too took a lenient view of the coup. Interestingly, they pressurised the US President to change his position in this issue[vi]. Retired US diplomats like George Landau, political analyst of American Enterprise Institute Roger Noriega, Roberto Bottome of Veneconomia –a political, economic and social analytical group from Caracas etc., come out with critical statements against the referendum attempt[vii]. They explicitly supported the coup and the formation of interim government. Washington Post, one of the most influential US publications challenged the position of Barack Obama and the State Department. Alvaro Vargas Llosa’s article in Washington Post justified the Honduran military, saying that it was Zelaya who persuaded the referendum by challenging court orders and tried to snatch the ballots from military and started distributing. Since, he tried to act against the ruling of the Supreme Court; the military has no other option rather to expel the President[viii]. Washington Post states that after removing the President, the military handed over the responsibility to the Congress. The Congress appointed the head of the legislative body, Roberto Micheletti, as interim President to continue the scheduled election process and so as the democratic system. The pro-Chavez President, who was attempting follow the Chavezian approach in an undemocratic way, was removed. In fact, the military safeguard the interest of the Honduras from the Venezuelian interventions.

On the other hand, those reports that supported the legality of Zelaya’s position stress that the referendum was not intended to extend either his tenure or to amend the constitution allowing him for another term in power. It was, instead, intended to convene a constitutional assembly to rewrite the constitution. In fact, the present constitution was written in 1982 during the peak of the Reagan Administration’s ‘dirty war’ in Central America. The supporters of Zelaya argue that the existing constitution primarily endorses the interests of a micro-minority, especially the people in the power. The interest of the working class and peasantry were largely unrecognised in it. Zelaya was pushing for the constitutional reform for them. The President was expected to win over the opposition from the Congress and Supreme Court towards the referendum with the support of labour unions and social movements who have better links with common people in the country.

In fact, the government announced the presidential election in November 2009 as Zelaya’s turn would be over by January 2010. According to the Constitution, there is no provision for re-election of the existing president. Zelaya never showed any intention to change this practice. In the non-binding referendum, he was attempted to answer to the ballot question of “Do you agree that, during the general elections of November 2009 there should be a fourth ballot to decide whether to hold a constituent National Assembly that will approve a new political constitution?[ix]” In Honduran election, each person will get three ballots viz;, one to elect the president and vice president, second for their parliamentary representative and the third for the municipal mayor. Zelaya tried for a public consultation through the fourth ballot box (cuarte urna) in the general election: that is, a proposal to hold a national referendum on the drafting of a new constitution.

Constitutional provisions

Zelaya’s closeness to the Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, however, has raised concern over the intentions behind the referendum. In all these countries, referendums were used to extend Presidential terms. While criticising the extension of terms through referendums, the critics of Chavez, Morales and Correa had completely ignored the wishes of the common people, who wanted many of these leaders to continue their political projects[x].

President Zelaya was proceeding with the electoral activities. The election was supposed to take place in November 2009. Even if the people accepted to convene a constitutional assembly to redraft the existing one, it would have been done under the newly elected president, not by Zelaya. Though there is a gap of two months between the election and assumption of power by the new president, it is not possible to convene a constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution and ratify it by Congress within that short period.

Another argument was about the legality of the referendum itself. According to the critics, the referendum was dismissed by the Supreme Court, so it was illegal. They support the positions of Attorney General, National Congress, Armed Forces and Supreme Electoral Tribunal who accused the president for trying to extend his term. While, Zelaya’s supporters claim that it was merely a non-binding public consultation to seek permission to rewrite constitution. Nowhere did he intend to extend his tenure in the office. He had, in fact, invoked article 5 of the Honduran “Civil Participation Act” of 2006 in which all public functionaries can perform non-binding public consultations to understand the popular opinion on policy changes[xi].

Real problems

The furore over the coup this time should be seen in the context of teh process of democratisation in Latin America. Referendums, constitutional reforms and military interventions are common in Latin American political history over the last two centuries. In the second half of 20th century, almost all Latin American countries have gone through revolutions and counter revolutions followed by military interventions. However, by the middle of 1980’s, the countries in the region started their democratisation processes by adopting elected democracies. To ensure the continuity of democracy, they had to rebuild all democratic institutions and they successfully reinstalled the democratic set up in the region. In this process some of the countries moved ahead by bringing people into the democratic arena.

Honduras experienced military interventions throughout 1970s. It was well-known that the Honduran military closely associated with the coveted US operations in the region, especially against the Sandinistas of Nicaragua. This association with US military establishments still continues as most of its officers including General Romeo Vasquez were trained by them. The creamy layer of the Honduran society, which includes the industrial elites, bureaucrats, politicians, and the military, were always able to control the government and always positioned closer to the US.

One of the key issues in the present imbroglio is the power relationship between the ousted president and the Constitutional Institutions. The tussle between the President and others started much before the date of referendum. In fact, the leftward turn of President Zelaya could be the main reason for the resentment. But the trigger was the change in his internal policies against the traditional approaches of former governments. Most significant issue was his decision to increase minimum wages in the country. In the second half of his presidency, Zelaya started to point out the role of the powerful affluent section of the society who controls the media, business houses, industry and influential bureaucracy in widening the social and economic disparity in the country. It is imperative to note that Honduras is the third poorest country in the hemisphere with 70 percent people lives in utter poverty. To reduce this disparity, he increased minimum wages by 60 percent and declared that “this is a government of great social transformations, committed to the poor[xii]”. This act has enhanced his popularity among the poor, working class and the trade unions. This made him the prominent enemy of the influential business community and traditional rich in the country.

While he became less popular among the upper segment of the society including his party, he has gained significant support among the majority of the population. This wider popularity has enhanced his confidence to conduct the referendum. Realising the ineffectiveness of constitutional institutions to tackle his wider popularity, opponents supported the coup d’état to protect their interests.

Geopolitical implications

There was a time when the US sceptically looked at the socialist/communist upspring in Latin American region. Prevention of the left interventions in the Latin American countries was in the priority list of the US foreign policy. Military interventions in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Nicaragua etc., were supported by the Intelligence Service of the US. However, in the last twenty odd years, the US interventionist policy in Latin America has changed drastically. This has coincided with the proliferation of democratically elected leftist governments through out the region. Instead of supporting the rightist forces to topple the left governments as earlier, the US accepted to work with them. So far, they have tolerated the most radical leftist leader, especially Chavez and his verbal challenges. However, the intentions of Chavez raised scepticism and the Bush administration expressed their displeasure at the diplomatic levels. Using Venezuelan oil, Chavez expands influence in the region and challenges the US initiatives through the ALBA. Through Zelaya, Honduras become a part of the radical leftist group. Moreover, the recent political change in Nicaragua and re-emergence of Sandinistas also would definitely challenge the US influence in the Central American region in coming days.

The coup d’état in Honduras raises concerns on the political balance in the region. The stalemate is continuing for a month. The peace talks initiated by the Costa Rican President turned to be futile. The US, the OAS and the governments in South and Central America continues their solidarity to the ousted president, pressurising the interim government to change its position. Just after the coup, Chavez accused the US, saying that, “behind these soldiers are the Honduran bourgeois, the rich who converted Honduras into banana republic, into a political and military base for North American imperialism[xiii]”. Latest development in this regard was the attempt of Zelaya to enter into Honduras from Nicaragua. He, along with his supporters, walked a few steps into the Honduran land to make a symbolic come back, and returned to Nicaragua. For the first time, the US administration has changed its tone. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton openly condemned Zelaya’s attempt saying that it was “reckless”[xiv]. Change in the US position can evoke devastating implication in the region. So far, the interim government is looking for a strong supporter in the region and if they can gather the US support; the entire political equation in the region will change. The US support can provide a kind of legitimacy to the interim government as well as for the military intervention. In that case, it can, thus, pave way for the successful military coup for the first time in this century in the region.

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[i] BBC, “Deadline for the Coup Leaders”, Viewed on 01 July 2009, (http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/07/090701_coupoas.shtml).
[ii] Press Release, “OAS Suspends Membership Of Honduras”, 5 July 2009, Viewed on 06 July 2009, (http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-219/09)
[iii] Carlsen, Laura, “Honduran Coup Turns Violent, Sanctions Imposed”, Viewed on 08 July 2009, (https://nacla.org/node/5955)
[iv] Ibid
[v] Thomson, John R., “Ousting a Chavez Wannable : We should support the removal of Zelaya”, Viewed on 07 July 2009, (http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NTBmMTUxMTk5NmY0MGVhYzhlNTk1MGIwODBlODI2YTg=)
[vi] The Washington Times, “Obama Stands with Tyrants: Honduras is part of a pattern”, Viewed on 08 July 2009, (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/02/obama-stands-with-tyrants/)
[vii] Thomson, John R., “Ousting a Chavez Wannable : We should support the removal of Zelaya”, Viewed on 07 July 2009, (http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NTBmMTUxMTk5NmY0MGVhYzhlNTk1MGIwODBlODI2YTg=)
[viii] Llosa, Alvaro Vargas, “Honduras Coup is President Zelaya’s Fault”, Washington Post, Views on 08 July 2009, (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR2009070103210.html)
[ix] Dangal, Benjamin, “Showdown in Honduras: The Rise, Repression and Uncertain Future of the Coup”, Viewed on 08 July 2009, (https://nacla.org/node/5949)
[x] Ross, Clifton, “From Bolivia to Honduras: Coups and Constitutions”, viewed on 09 July 2009, (http://counterpunch.com/ross06292009.html)

[xi] Democratic Underground, “Why President Zelaya’s Actions in Honduras Were Legal and Constitutional”, viewed on 09 July 2009, (http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=389x5965362)
[xii] Kozloff, Nikolas, “Obama’s Real Message to Latin America?: The Coup in Honduras”, Viewed on 09 July 2009, (http://counterpunch.com/kozloff06292009.html)
[xiii] Ibid
[xiv] Gibbs, Stephen, “Zelaya stages Honduras ‘road show’”, BBC News, Viewed on 26 July 2009, (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8169101.stm)